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Abstract: 
 
The paper examines the context of the first introduction of the concept of ‘cultural 
capital’ in the sociology of education analyses undertaken in the early 1960s and 
published by Bourdieu in collaboration with Jean-Claude Passeron in ‘Les étudiants et 
leurs études’ (1964) and Les Héritiers (1964).  It first considers the cultural contexts 
within which Bourdieu’s thinking about culture originated – both in relation to his 
social origins and in relation to his intellectual training.  It then examines the extent to 
which Bourdieu’s early anthropological research in Algeria was influenced by his 
knowledge of American acculturation theory.  It concludes that Bourdieu sought to 
use acculturation theory in a distinctive way – one which he articulated more 
confidently as he explored the relationship between agency and structural explanation 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  The specific educational researches which 
stimulated the articulation of the concept of ‘linguistic’ or ‘cultural’ capital belonged 
to the period in which Bourdieu was only just beginning to refine his post-structuralist 
philosophy of social scientific explanation.  To use these concepts now involves 
deploying them reflexively in accordance with Bourdieu’s later thinking rather than at 
face value as they were first developed during the period in which he and Passeron 
were ‘apprentice’ researchers. 
 
  
The origins, development and status of Bourdieu’s concept of ‘cultural capital’. 
 
 
 
The cultural contexts for the development of Bourdieu’s concept of culture. 
 
 
To explore Bourdieu’s concept of ‘cultural capital’, I need to go back to his 
beginnings.  His post hoc representation of his upbringing was that he had been raised 
in divided worlds.  There are passages in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology in 
which Bourdieu reflected on the way in which, like Flaubert, he had acquired the 
capacity to think objectively about his personal experience as a result of being sent at 
an early age to a boarding school (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, 205).  Equally, in 
Language and Symbolic Power, Bourdieu drew upon his childhood experience of a  
linguistic division  between the Béarn dialect of the home and the French of his 
schooling (Bourdieu, 1992, 68-9).  Whether or not this was post hoc theorising about 
his youth, whether, in other words, there had been an experiential division which had 
generated a dualistic conceptualisation or whether the conceptualisation was read 
back into his experience, is not certain, but the fact remains that Bourdieu’s thinking 
was always characterised by a duality between what one might call natural, familial, 
domestic, or traditional culture on the one hand and artificial, acquired, constructed or 
public culture on the other.  This duality was reinforced institutionally.  It was a 
duality between regional, provincial, or indigenous culture and metropolitan, central-
state, or colonialist culture, or, more generally and philosophically, between the ‘life-
world’ and the ‘system-world’.  It was a duality which Bourdieu was to seek to 
transform into a dialectic. 
 
The character of Bourdieu’s social and intellectual trajectory is well known.  From 
being a clever pupil in his local lycée in Pau in the Pyrenees in South-West France, 
Bourdieu moved to one of the prestigious classes préparatoires on the Left Bank in 
Paris before gaining admission to the Ecole Normale Supérieure.  His achievement in 
respect of acquired culture consolidated the physical detachment of the acquired from 
the natural. Philosophical training was the common curriculum of the Ecole, but,  
from what he said retrospectively  in “Fieldwork in Philosophy” published in Choses 
Dites in 1987 (Bourdieu, 1987), he was particularly influenced both by the historians 
and philosophers of science of the French tradition (Vuillemin, Weill, Bachelard, 
Canguilhem, Duhem) and by aspects of phenomenology, ontology and existentialism.  
He admitted to having read Sartre without being an existentialist, and to having read 
Heidegger and Husserl.  Internal evidence suggests that he was greatly influenced by 
the work of Merleau-Ponty.  Although Bourdieu only mentioned his reading of early 
Husserl, again internal evidence suggests that he was familiar with some key texts of 
Husserl which were published posthumously – The Crisis of the European Sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology (Husserl, 1970) and Experience and Judgement 
(Husserl, 1973).  Bourdieu was simultaneously interested in the philosophy of science 
and neo-Kantian epistemology and in the phenomenological project which subjected 
objectivist science to criticism.  Bourdieu became interested in Cassirer’s philosophy 
of symbolic forms as versions of Kantian categories which implied that he was 
interested in competing, socially constructed forms or explanatory discourses rather 
than in a priori, transcendental categories.  He seems to have been influenced more by 
phenomenological method than by the claims of transcendental phenomenology 
which means that he took method from the early Husserl but was more sympathetic to 
Husserl’s late attempt to accommodate historical and social contingency.  In all of 
this, Bourdieu’s philosophical orientation was functional or instrumentalist.  He had 
no interest in speculative philosophy.  His philosophical reading provided him with a 
language with which he could talk objectively about the dualities of his experience. 
The form of Bourdieu’s studies reinforced a separation of the intellect from primary 
experience, whilst the content of those studies provided him with a philosophical 
discourse in which to articulate this dual experience. To put this in Husserlian terms, 
Bourdieu was interested both in the competing discourses of objective sciences and in 
the pre-predicative intentionality upon which all scientific discourses are dependent.  
Bourdieu had acquired the artificial culture of philosophical discourse but he used that 
discourse to articulate the differences between the ontological and the 
epistemological, natural being and socially acquired knowing. 
 
Another point to make about Bourdieu’s beginnings is that he was intellectually 
formed in a tradition which paid little attention to the analysis of culture.  There was 
no tradition that corresponded with the Kulturgeschichte or Geisteswissenschaft of the 
German tradition.  Comte made no separate space for cultural analysis.  Cultural 
phenomena were objects to be understood positivistically and possessed no distinctive 
truth claims.  As we know from Bourdieu and Passeron’s “Sociology and Philosophy 
in France since 1945” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1967), the problem for them was that 
Comte had been attached to a realist philosophy of science.  Applying Einstein to the 
social sciences involved the recognition of functional relations rather than substantive 
entities.  The theory of relativity had ousted Durkheim’s Comtist commitment to the 
analysis of ‘social facts as things’, but relational analysis gave no more privileged 
status to cultural phenomena than had realist positivism.  Methodologically, in fact, 
there was some distinct affinity between phenomenology, positivism and logical 
positivism and Bourdieu was predictably unsympathetic to Dilthey, to Rickert,  to 
Weber’s theory of charisma, to intuitionism or to hermeneutics.  His reference to 
Gadamer at the beginning of The Rules of Art (Bourdieu, 1996, xiv) is a late example 
of this hostility.  It was not part of Bourdieu’s training to isolate the study of 
autonomous culture.  In so far as ‘culture’ was an issue, Bourdieu would have been 
more interested in the legacy of Bergsonian vitalism and in Merleau-Ponty’s attempt, 
notably in The Structure of Behaviour (Merleau-Ponty, 1965), to engineer an 
encounter between the pre-logical and processes of biological adaptation.  In short, 
Bourdieu was interested in the encounters between the cultures of persons rather than 
in cultures for themselves.  He described how his initial purpose in his Algerian 
researches was to explore philosophical positions empirically and, in particular, to 
carry out a ‘phenomenology of affective life’ (Bourdieu, 1987, 16; 1990, 6-7).  He 
was always fascinated by the implications of Goethe’s use of the idea of ‘elective 
affinity’ and this was made most explicit in the title adopted for the posthumous 
publication of his interview with Franz Schultheis about his early Algerian 
photographs:  Images d’Algérie.  Une affinité élective (Bourdieu, 2003).   Bourdieu 
was interested in understanding how far cultural tastes are biologically determined or 
how far individuals inherit a natural culture which circumscribes their choices of 
artificial cultural products or symbols.  Bourdieu was interested in objective culture so 
as to understand how it is deployed by individuals to manage their cultural 
adaptations.  The use of the word ‘understand’ is also significant because, 
methodologically, Bourdieu’s research was conducted in pursuit of comprehension 
rather than explanation.  I think he would have agreed with Lyotard’s statement in his 
first book – La phénoménologie (1954) – that: 
 “To explain in the human sciences in truth is to render comprehensible” 
(Lyotard, 1991, 76) 
 
 
Proximate origins of an approach to cultural analysis. 
 
Bourdieu’s work in Algeria was exploratory.  He recognised that French colonial 
intervention had forced rural and nomadic tribespeople to modify their attitudes and 
behaviour in order to adjust to living in Algiers.  He wanted to investigate this process 
of enforced cultural adaptation.  His first book – Sociologie de l’Algérie (Bourdieu, 
1958) – was an attempt to describe the status quo ante.  Bourdieu offered accounts of 
the different social organisations of four tribes.  These were descriptions which were 
to be the base-line for his subsequent interviews in Algiers with people from these 
tribes whose behaviour had changed in response to a new set of modern, urban 
conditions.  Without interposing any orientation towards causal explanation, Bourdieu 
tried to set up a framework within which behavioural phenomena before and after 
might be compared.  He deployed social science to give his accounts of tribal 
organisation, using, for instance, Weber’s analysis of protestantism to generate an 
account of the function of Islamic fundamentalism in the Moabite tribe.  He also 
gained experience for the first time in working with statisticians to produce, in Travail 
et travailleurs en Algérie (Bourdieu, 1963), a text in which statistical data and 
qualitative ethnographic information were juxtaposed and in which he wrote a short 
introductory statement outlining the complementary function of statistics and case-
studies in constituting a description of a social whole.  He was exploring ways of 
describing social phenomena and of extrapolating from juxtaposed phenomena some 
account of culturally adaptive processes.  He was, in other words, examining the 
validity of different kinds of social science explanation within a framework in which 
he was dominantly interested in the non-causally linked juxtaposition of observed 
phenomena.  The bibliography of Sociologie de l’Algérie indicates that Bourdieu had 
read, in preparation for his Algerian work, several American acculturation theorists of 
the 1940s and 1950s.  Notably, he cited Melville Herskovits and Margaret Mead.  The 
particular text of Herskovits cited by Bourdieu was his Acculturation.  The study of 
culture contact.  (Herskovits, 1938).  This was an important book which provided an 
elaborated response to an Outline on Acculturation published shortly before by the 
Sub-Committee of the American Social Science Research Council.  The sub-
committee had sought to define acculturation in order to regulate work which was 
politically sensitive in respect of race relations research with regard to both Blacks 
and American Indians.  Herskovits had been a member of the sub-committee (with 
Ralph Linton and Robert Redfield) but he chose to present his own views 
independently and in more detail.  His book provided useful category distinctions 
between acculturation, assimilation, and diffusion, and it vigorously argued for the 
necessity of adopting a historical methodology so as to identify changes which were 
the consequence of culture contact.  It also argued that acculturation analysis entailed 
the analysis of the attitudes and behaviour of people as carriers of culture rather than 
of objectified ‘cultures’.  These emphases would have attracted Bourdieu.  The 
following discussion of the appropriate methodology to be adopted in acculturation 
studies, for instance, characterises precisely Bourdieu’s procedure in his Algerian 
fieldwork, spanning the period from 1958 to 1961.  Herskovits wrote: 
 
“Though the discussion of the necessity for obtaining reconstructions of the 
earlier life of a people has here followed that of the need for the description of 
their life as it is lived at present, there are cases where the wisest practice in 
the actual study of acculturation would seem to be to derive the base-line from 
which the changes developed first, and then, once equipped with the insight 
into past conditions, to obtain relevant data concerning the contemporary 
manner of living.  Where such a course is followed, the evaluation of changes 
that have occurred as a result of contact will be surer, and an understanding of 
the effect had by the forces operative in the situation of change more clear, 
than if the present-day culture is first studied without reference to the past.” 
(Herskovits, 1938, 25) 
 
 However, Herskovits’s underlying assumption became apparent in his attack on 
‘applied anthropology’. He criticised the tendency of some anthropologists to become 
partisan in their analyses of, especially, culture contacts occurring in the context of 
colonialism.  Herskovits singled out Richard Thurnwald’s Black and White in East 
Africa (1935), quoting Thurnwald’s assertion on the first page of his book that 
“At no time in the history of mankind has a clash of nations, peoples, races, 
and their cultures, traditional prejudices, interests and abilities taken place like 
today.” (Thurnwald, 1935, 1, quoted in Herskovits, 1938,31) 
 
Herskovits’s contention was that ‘contacts of the sort now occurring between 
nationals of colonizing governments and native peoples are of no different order than 
those that have certainly occurred since recorded history began – and perhaps since 
mankind has inhabited the earth - …’ (Herskovits, 1938, 30-1).  In focusing on the 
particular, applied anthropologists ran the risk that they failed to analyse the universal 
dimension of the phenomena they were studying and, consequently, failed to generate 
‘science’.  Herskovits was provoked by his dislike of applied anthropology to define 
the proper nature of anthropological science in the following way: 
“A basic justification of ethnological research is that it gives a broad 
background against which to judge our own rules of behaviour, and a more 
inclusive view of human cultures than can be attained by any other social 
discipline.  This is because it alone offers data against which we can project 
customs peculiar to ourselves and, in the manner of scientific research, test 
generalizations arising out of the study of the patterns of our culture by seeing 
whether or not these generalizations have validity when applied to peoples 
whose customs have no historical connection with our own.” (Herskovits, 
1938, 31) 
 
 
Bourdieu’s distinctive adaptation of acculturation analysis. 
 
 
I don’t want unduly to labour these references to Herskovits, but the extent to which 
Bourdieu differed from Herskovits in respect of the status and function to be assigned 
to social science, or differed radically from Herskovits in relation to the philosophy of 
social science, is important for my argument about the origin, development and status 
of Bourdieu’s concept of ‘cultural capital’.  Herskovits can be seen as a proto-
structuralist, deploying empirical, inductivist procedures to generate universal laws of 
culture contact.  This was the function of science and to be successful it was essential 
that the scientist should be hors de combat – conceptually and institutionally objective 
and detached.  Although Bourdieu had not fully articulated his position at the time of 
his Algerian fieldwork, nevertheless he was explicit in his first book that the stimulus 
for his study was the ‘clash of civilizations’ which he was observing and experiencing 
during his military service in Algeria.  Unlike Herskovits, Bourdieu was not interested 
in extrapolating scientific truths from his observations but, importantly, this does not 
mean that his analyses were partisan.  He strove to produce a functional 
objectification.  It was functional on two levels.  Sociologie de l’Algérie was an 
objective account of traditional social organization which served as a base-line to 
guide the practices of indigenous researchers who constituted the team of assistants 
working on the two subsequent empirical analyses of ‘modern’ Algerian society.  It 
was designed therefore to be immanently functional in helping Algerians to introduce 
the strengths of their cultures into the process of constituting the identity of a post-
colonial, independent Algeria state.  It was also designed to be cross-culturally 
functional.  Bourdieu’s Sociologie de l’Algérie was published in 1958 in the Que Sais-
je series of small, introductory texts produced by the Presses Universitaires de 
France.  This was the same year that Camus re-issued some of his earlier journalistic 
coverage of poverty and suffering in Kabylia as Chroniques algériennes. (Camus, 
1958).  It was not simply that Bourdieu’s account of Algeria was a topical piece of 
reporting with the same character as Camus’ book.  I think the intention was much 
more philosophical.  Whatever Bourdieu’s reservations about Sartre’s work may have 
been at that date – and they were certainly highly developed reservations later in the 
period after the publication of Sartre’s Critique de la raison dialectique in 1963 
(Sartre, 1963)1 – nevertheless the text had a significance in a relationship between 
author and reader not unlike that described by Sartre in relation to novels in Qu’est-ce 
que c’est la littérature? (Sartre, 1948).  Bourdieu’s text was seeking to function cross-
culturally in a manner which is similar to that proposed by Sartre in respect of inter-
subjectivity in L’Etre et le Néant (Sartre, 1943).  As T.J. Owens has summarised 
Sartre’s position on this point: 
“The ‘stare’ of the other engenders in me this new ontological structure which 
was not there before and which could arrive only by the agency of the other.” 
(Owens, 1970, 34)  
Bourdieu interposed his text between two cultures.  He saw himself in part as a 
conceptual go-between, hoping to modify the identities of his French readership by 
offering Algerian society as a constituting other – hoping to engineer irenically an 
attitudinal convergence.2 
 
In short, I believe that social science discourse was always only of limited interest to 
Bourdieu as supposed social explanation.  It was always a mode of description, a 
language game, which was potentially of instrumental value in bringing about 
attitudinal and ethical or socio-political harmonisation.  He had no sympathy for  the 
mystery of Durkheim’s conscience collective but he was sufficiently a product of the 
Durkheimian legacy to want to deploy a form of what he was later to call ‘socio-
                                       
1  For a discussion of Bourdieu’s early response to Sartrean ethics in reflecting upon the 
responsibility of the ethnographer in a colonial situation, see Robbins, 2003b. 
2  I have discussed this in more detail (with reference to Jacques Bouveresse’s consideration of 
the philosophical status of social texts in his discussion of the Sokal & Bricmont hoax in his Prodiges 
et vertiges de l’analogie, 1999) in an article due to appear in Theory, Culture and Society in 2005, 
entitled:  “Texts, contexts, pretexts and science”. 
analytic encounter’ to encourage a vision of a society which is committed to the 
internal and continuous process of deconstructing and reconstructing consciousnesses  
which competitively aspire to secure collective authority3.  He had little sympathy for 
the Kantian transcendental a priori, but he sought to introduce a process which 
differently might lead to universal peace4.  Bourdieu was certainly aware of Husserl’s 
rejection of the extravagant knowledge claims of empiricism5, admitting, as Lyotard 
put it, that ‘empiricism cannot be understood empirically’.  By varying imaginatively 
the ways in which we perceive objects, we are able to grasp the essence of the object 
– not a pre-existent Platonic idea of the object but the practically immanent 
characteristics which establish that something is not something else.  Paraphrasing 
Husserl’s Ideen I, Lyotard writes: 
“The process of imaginary variation gives us the essence itself, the being of 
the object.  The object (Objekt) is ‘something whatever’, for example the 
number two, the note do, the circle, any proposition, a sensible datum.  We 
can vary it arbitrarily, … The essence or eidos of the object is constituted by 
the invariant which remains identical across the variations.” (Lyotard, 1999, 
12) 
 
To summarise very briefly, I am saying that Bourdieu regarded the discourses of the 
sciences as contrived language games which were alienated from natural culture.  
This did not cause him to be reductive or sceptical but it did cause him to deploy these 
discourses, varying them imaginatively, so as to isolate essences which are 
                                       
3  For an elaboration of my interpretation of the relationship of Bourdieu’s thinking to the 
classical sociological tradition and to phenomenological philosophy, see Robbins, 2003a and Robbins 
2003c. 
4  For further discussion of this point, see Robbins, 2005a (forthcoming) 
5  For further consideration of the significance of Husserl’s influence on Bourdieu’s work, see 
Robbins 2005b (forthcoming) 
contingently changeable socially, geographically and historically – pragmatic 
essences, perhaps – rather than essences which are uniformly or universally 
transcendental.  Cross-cultural harmony could be achievable at the level of encounter 
between contingently different essences rather than at the level of objectivist 
homogenisation.  This is the rationale for Bourdieu’s strategic movement between 
intellectual discourses in seeking to understand social phenomena, sometimes 
insisting, for instance in his changing attitude towards the work of Flaubert, that the 
transformation of social observation into ‘art’ diminishes the capacity of the 
observation to generate social change, whilst sometimes insisting that artistic activity 
provides the possibility of liberation from the system-controlled, self-fulfilling 
practices of social scientists operating in accordance with routinized procedures and 
moribund concepts6.  At the micro-level, within discipline discourses, this is also the 
rationale for Bourdieu’s linguistic improvisations, deploying the terminology of 
anthropology  (‘inheritors’) to explore the operation of the French higher education 
system or, more importantly for this current discussion, deploying the language of 
economics (‘capital’) to explore cultural exchange. Early in his career,  Bourdieu 
articulated this methodology and the associated philosophy of social science in his  
“Structuralism and Theory of Sociological Knowledge” (Bourdieu, 1968), referring, 
in collaboration with others in Le métier de sociologue (Bourdieu, Chamboredon & 
Passeron, 1968, 1991) to the need to see social research as involving a continuously 
creative ars inveniendi (art of invention). 
 
 
                                       
6  see Robbins, 2000, chapter 4: “Flaubert and the social ambivalence of literary invention”. 
The practical cultural analyses undertaken by Bourdieu and Passeron and the 
emergence of ‘cultural capital’ as a conceptual tool for understanding social 
differentiation. 
 
 
This has been a necessary preamble to the consideration which now follows of the 
development of Bourdieu’s concept of ‘cultural capital’.  I want to explore first the 
terminology of ‘culture’ and ‘capital’ as  used by Bourdieu in the research report 
which he wrote with Jean-Claude Passeron as Les étudiants et leur études (Bourdieu 
& Passeron, 1964a) for the Centre de sociologie européenne and which formed the 
basis of the book which they were to publish the same year as Les Héritiers, les 
étudiants et la culture (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964b).  The report presented the results 
of two surveys which were conducted in the academic years 1961-2 and 1962-3, 
mainly of Sociology and Philosophy students and mainly at the University of Lille.  I 
want to spend some time on the two questionnaires because, obviously, the nature of 
the questions asked is indicative of the conceptual framework which was being 
deployed. 
 
The first questionnaire had 52 questions.  The anonymous respondents were first 
asked to specify nationality; civil status – single, married, or divorced; sex, date of 
birth; Faculty; University; date of entry to the Faculty.  These elicited basic personal 
details with a concentration on the respondents’ institutional locations.  There 
followed one question in which respondents were asked to give the profession, the 
highest qualification and the place of residence in 1962 of father, mother and paternal 
grand-father.  Questions 9 and 10 asked about religious affiliation and degree of 
religious activity.  Questions 11 and 12 asked about the financial circumstances of the 
students and whether they had regular work alongside their studies.  Questions 13 and 
14 asked where they had received their secondary education – in which town and in 
what kind of institution.  Questions 15 to 24 asked the respondents to report on their 
previous educational performance and to give their personal evaluation of that 
performance.  Questions 25 to 28 asked about their choices of subject and university.  
Questions 29 to 38 asked about the views of the respondents about the nature and 
purpose of sociology (or philosophy).  Questions 39 to 46 asked what kinds of study 
techniques or learning methods the respondents had developed.  Question 47 asked 
what newspapers and periodicals were read regularly.  Questions 48 to 52 asked 
respondents to characterise their political and trade union affiliations and the degree 
of their involvement. 
 
The second questionnaire had 41 questions.  The first 14 questions asked for the same 
kinds of personal details as had the first questionnaire.  Question 15 asked whether the 
respondents had read classical texts other than those prescribed by teachers – never, 
occasionally, often.  Question 16 asked if the respondents read cultural reviews 
related to the cinema, jazz, music, painting, or the theatre.  Question 18 offered 18 
dramatists and respondents were asked to indicate whether they knew the works of 
these authors and, if so, whether this was the result of reading or of knowing 
productions, either from stage performances or radio or television.  Respondents were 
also asked whether they subscribed to a theatre and whether they had been involved in 
amateur dramatics.  Question 21 similarly offered a list of 26 films with similar 
supplementary questions.  Again, question 25 offered a list of 10 classical composers 
and respondents were asked whether they knew the work of the composers and how.  
Again, Question 26 offered a list of 11 jazz musicians.  Question 27 offered a list of 
12 jazz pieces and respondents were asked to date them approximately as before 
1935, 1935 to 1945 and after 1945.  There followed some questions about whether the 
respondents played a musical instrument and how much they watched television or 
listened to the radio.  Question 34 offered 12 painters and respondents were asked 
whether they knew the work of the painters and how they had seen the paintings.  
They were also asked what reproductions of whose works they would choose to hang 
on their walls and several other questions about art appreciation and artistic capacity.  
Question 40 asked respondents what had been the particularly striking events of their 
intellectual or artistic lives and Question 41 invited them to specify what new courses 
they would like to see created in the university. 
 
We can deduce from these questions and with the benefit of hindsight in relation to 
the future development of Bourdieu’s work that the tension underlying these 
questionnaires is between sociology, sociology of culture, and, perhaps, cultural 
analysis.  We have to remember that Bourdieu had only recently come back to 
mainland France at the beginning of these two survey enquiries.  He had been invited 
by Raymond Aron to be the secretary to the Centre de sociologie européenne, but he 
was also attending the research seminars of Claude Lévi-Strauss.  The second edition 
of Sociologie de l’Algérie was published in 1961 (Bourdieu, 1961) and it showed the 
influence of Lévi-Strauss in its mode of presentation.  The English translation was 
published in the States in 1962 as The Algerians (Bourdieu, 1962) with a preface by 
Aron.  Travail et travailleurs en Algérie – Bourdieu’s second Algerian book – was not 
published until 1963 whilst his third Algerian book – Le déracinement, la crise de 
l’agriculture traditionnelle en Algérie – was not published until 1964 (Bourdieu, 
1964).  In relation to what I have argued in my introduction, Bourdieu was 
experimenting with various discourses to represent acculturation processes.  He was 
having to choose how to define himself intellectually.  He was opting for self-
presentation in terms of social and cultural anthropology or sociology so as to present 
himself as a scientist rather than a speculative philosopher, but his specific orientation 
was to use scientific discourse to disclose what might be happening in social 
encounters understood phenomenologically. 
 
The general introduction to Les étudiants et leurs études acknowledges some of the 
limitations of the methodology employed or discusses the general validity of the 
findings.  In defending findings derived from questionnaires completed by students 
who attended their classes (because the questionnaires were completed in class), 
Bourdieu and Passeron remarked in conclusion that 
“A collection of researches which had as its first object to grasp attitudes 
towards the School and scholastic culture was therefore able legitimately to 
restrict itself to the active student population.” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964a, 
10) 
 
The first object of the research, in other words, was to analyse the variety of attitudes 
amongst students towards academic values and institutions.  It was only in the last 
paragraph of the general introduction that Bourdieu and Passeron admit that their 
differentiation of attitudes related primarily to differentiation on the basis of social 
origin.  Their sociology of culture sat unhappily on a sociology of social origin which 
was stripped of objective class differentiation.  I want to continue to explore this 
tension between social and cultural analysis because it seems to me that it is at the 
heart of what should be our contemporary discussion about the relationship between 
cultural capital and social exclusion.  In the last paragraph, Bourdieu and Passeron 
wrote: 
 
“Given that the social origin of students seemed to us to be the principal factor 
of differentiation, we wanted to grasp its action in different domains by 
moving from the most obvious like living conditions to the most hidden like 
cultural practice and attitudes towards scholastic and non-scholastic culture.  
The specialists are agreed in accepting the influence of social origin on the 
behaviour, attitudes and opinions of students without always being capable of 
bringing to light the collection of mechanisms, particularly the most sly and 
subtle ones, by which it is exercised.” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964a, 10) 
 
What is methodologically grasped as social differentiation is viewed in its various 
manifestations to such an extent that Bourdieu and Passeron are actually analysing the 
ways in which cultural differences consolidate or even constitute those social 
differences.  The research was not designed to establish that cultural differences were 
the consequences of different social origins, reflecting a prior social reality.  Instead, 
it was designed to show that social and cultural differences are inseparable and that, 
through time, the social which is synonymous with natural or indigenous culture, is 
modified by degrees of initiation into artificial, acquired culture.  Les  étudiants et 
leurs etudes anticipates La Distinction (Bourdieu, 1979, 1984) in recognizing a 
continuous dialectic between two types of culture.  In highlighting educational 
processes as instruments of cultural differentiation, Bourdieu and Passeron were 
already indicating that the social situation is not intrinsically social - if by that is 
meant ‘socio-economically class determined’ - but instead a context of constant 
accultural affectivity, constant oscillation between natural and acquired cultures, 
within generations and inter-generationally, whereby one person’s natural culture 
encounters another’s acquired culture and vice versa. 
 
The important achievement of Les étudiants et leurs études was that it showed that 
social exclusion (to use this term anachronistically) is a continuous process.  There is 
no one Culture with a capital C to be acquired by the socially deprived which will 
remedy their supposed deficiencies.  Cultural capital does not possess absolute value 
which is quantifiable.  It only possesses value in exchange and the exchange is a 
social struggle as much as a struggle of cultural value judgement. These views are 
implicitly contained in the introduction to the first part of Les étudiants et leurs 
études.  Bourdieu and Passeron began: 
 
“The simple statistics of gaining entry to higher education in relation to 
categories of social origin shows clearly that the scholastic system continually 
eliminates a high proportion of children originating from the most 
disadvantaged classes.  Does this mean to say that those who have escaped 
elimination have completely escaped, once and for all, the effects of 
disadvantaging factors?  To prejudge nothing we must test the extent and the 
effectiveness of the action of different factors of differentiation, from the most 
obvious and accepted like religious affiliation or gender, to the most concealed 
and denied. 
To evaluate accurately the force of these factors of differentiation, we must 
bear in mind that they do not act in the same conditions.  It is in the student 
milieu that the differences which adhere to social origin have the most chance 
of being neutralised since students have, by definition, suffered, over a long 
period of years, the homogenising action of scholastic discipline.  That is why 
the student milieu offers a privileged field of study since the differences that 
can be grasped there, especially the most subtle ones, demonstrate a fortiori 
the influence exercised by the milieu of social origin as a factor of cultural 
inequality.” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1964a, 13) 
 
In other words, Bourdieu and Passeron were most interested in examining the 
phenomena of social differentiation and they acknowledged that to study students as a 
sub-group was to take an element of the population where the effects of 
differentiation by reference to acquired culture would conceal the indigenous 
differences within the whole population.  It is clear that their orientation was to 
analyse differentiation. 
 
Implications for following Bourdieu’s practice. 
 
I want to finish by trying to bring together the two parts of my article.  Bourdieu and 
Passeron became assimilated to the discourse of sociology in the 1960s.  
Predominantly, they collaborated on projects which were at the interface between the 
sociology of education and the sociology of culture.  Again, they collaborated in 
producing Le métier de sociologue in 1968.  This was a text in which Bourdieu and 
his collaborators discussed the epistemological preliminaries for sociological enquiry, 
but I think that Bourdieu still retained his underlying interest in the phenomenology of 
affective encounter and still retained insights derived from his Algerian fieldwork.  
Part of the problem became the difficulty of trying to analyse culture changes within 
the discourse of sociology or from a vantage point which was that of the socially and 
institutionally detached academic.  It was Bourdieu exclusively who shifted away 
from the objectivist analysis of social and cultural encounters towards the attempt to 
manifest the behaviour of immanent social agents who were dynamically constructing 
their strategies for achieving social distinction.  The article entitled “Condition de 
classe et position de classe” (Bourdieu, 1966) is an important milestone in the 
recognition that sociological labelling is a social practice which is immanent within 
the observed society rather than extraneous.  The further reflection on his Algerian 
research led to Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique (Bourdieu, 1972) which was a 
significant break with objectivist, structuralist explanation in favour of an attempt to 
acknowledge that structural distinctions are the construction of social agents who are 
struggling to reconcile their indigenous cultures (their habitus) with those objectified 
cultures which carry value and power. The tensions between the thinking of Bourdieu 
and Passeron at this period – which caused them to cease collaborating from the early 
1970s onwards – have more general significance in assessing the relations between 
the separate analyses of culture and society and the analysis of culture and society (to 
borrow the title of Williams’s book of 1958 (Williams, 1958), and are in need of 
closer scrutiny.  Questions relating to the trans-national cross-fertilization between 
intellectual traditions are also at stake here.  The effect of Passeron’s preface to his 
translation of Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy (Hoggart, 1957), published in 1970 as 
La culture du pauvre (Passeron, 1970) was to attempt to transform an English proto-
‘cultural study’ – written, as was Williams’s book, in the tradition of English literary 
criticism - into a work of socio-anthropological analysis.  Conversely, the parallel 
development of the work of Bernstein and Bourdieu/Passeron pushed the analysis of 
educational processes away from a concentration on culture and away from a social 
anthropological perspective towards the adoption of socio-linguistic explanatory 
models.  It is significant that the French text of Les Héritiers (Bourdieu & Passeron, 
1964) refers only to ‘capital linguistique’  (linguistic capital) in its analysis, which 
was replaced with ‘cultural capital’ in the 1979 translation (Bourdieu & Passeron, 
1979), and also significant that the apparent domination of an orientation to cultural 
analysis only appeared in the title of the English translation of La Reproduction 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970) as Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture 
(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977).7  Passeron did not associate himself with the two 
research projects of the 1960s in which Bourdieu, with other colleagues, explored 
sociologically the reception of consecrated culture - L’amour de l’art, les musées 
d’art et leur public (Bourdieu, Darbel & Schnapper, 1966, 1990) – and the process of 
aesthetically consecrating the everyday practice of photography  - Un art moyen 
(Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, & Chamboredon, 1965, 1990).  It could be said that 
these were projects (and texts) which anticipated Bourdieu’s attempt of the 1970s to 
develop a procedure for understanding the reciprocal dynamics of cultural  grass-roots 
agency and institutionalised cultural conservation and that these attempts were, 
finally, at odds with a more conventionally static structural analysis as recommended 
by Passeron, whether in terms of socio-linguistic or social anthropological science. 
It was the research project on ‘Le Patronat’ in the early 1970s which generated three 
important articles: “Les stratégies de reconversion.  Les classes sociales et le système 
de l’enseignement” (Bourdieu, Boltanski & de Saint Martin,1973); “Le titre et le 
                                       
7  The original French sub-title was Eléments pour une théorie du système d’enseignement, but 
the English title was probably justified by reference to the paper which Bourdieu gave at the Durham 
conference of the British Sociological Association in 1970 – “Reproduction culturelle et reproduction 
sociale” which was subsequently first published in English as “Cultural Reproduction and Social 
Reproduction” in Brown, ed., 1973. 
 
poste.  Rapports entre le système de production et le système de reproduction” 
(Bourdieu & Boltanski, 1975); and the single-authored “Avenir de classe et causalité 
du probable” (Bourdieu, 1974).  These articles consolidated Bourdieu’s relationalism, 
his intention to show how the variables isolated for analysis by social scientists are 
elements of the game of position-taking.  This work was pursued in La distinction 
(Bourdieu, 1979), Homo Academicus (Bourdieu, 1984) and La noblesse d’état 
(Bourdieu, 1989).  It is this understanding of the immanent dynamics of society which 
is lacking in some of the attempts which have been made to use Bourdieu’s concepts 
socio-metrically.  Detached observation was, for Bourdieu, one perspective to be 
adopted in social relations.  “Avenir de classe et causalité du probable” was an article 
which pursued further Bourdieu’s early consideration in the context of his Algerian 
research of the revolutionary potential of the sub-proletariat, but, more generally, it 
raised the question of the relationship between statistical projections generated by 
objective social scientists and the immanent life-chance projections of those social 
agents who are the mathematised objects of statistical analysis.  It continued the 
exploration that had been undertaken in the same terms in “La fin d’un 
malthusianisme?” (Bourdieu & Darbel, 1966) in relation to the tension between the 
rational analysis of fertility rates offered in population studies statistics and the 
socially determined differential capacity of real people to exercise rational calculation 
in birth control.  It ran in parallel with the discussion in “L’opinion publique n’existe 
pas” (Bourdieu, 1971) of the relationship between the characterisation of political 
opinions offered by political scientists by extrapolating from opinion polls and the 
socially differentiated profile of political attitudes distributed within populations. 
People are situated at points on a spectrum extending from, at one extreme, 
possession of a-political, ethical, natural or indigenous dispositions, to, at the other 
extreme, acquiescence in pre-digested positions advanced by party political 
machinery. As the title of “Avenir de classe et causalité du probable” suggests, 
Bourdieu discussed in detail the relationship between ‘mechanism’ which supposes 
that actions are the manifestations of prior conditions, and ‘finalism’ which supposes 
that actions are directed by future-oriented projection.  To register this tension had 
always been the significance of Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ which sought to 
provide a conceptual tool for comprehending that the capacity to project forwards 
which people really possess is understandable as a function of their prior social 
condition rather than in terms of abstract mathematical models.  Some social 
conditions lead to the generation of abstract models but the explanatory value of these 
models is not universal but simply a function of the particular conditions of their 
generation which have to be weighted alongside the future projections emerging from 
alternative conditions. It is significant that Bourdieu’s reflection on the relationship 
between natural and artificial cultures is mirrored by his reflection on the relationship 
between subjective meaning and objective reality.  In both cases, Bourdieu’s thinking 
was informed by his reading of Husserl on time.  As he puts his position in “Avenir de 
classe et causalité du probable”: 
 
“Economic competence is not then a universally and uniformly extended 
aptitude.  The art of estimating and seizing chances, of seeing the future 
‘appresented’ (as Husserl puts it to distinguish this from the imaginary future 
of a project) in the present configuration, the capacity to introduce the future 
by a kind of practical induction or even to play the possible off against the 
probable by a calculated risk, these are all dispositions which can only be 
acquired under certain conditions, that is to say in certain social conditions.” 
(Bourdieu, 1974, 11) 
 
 The essence of Bourdieu’s ‘reflexivity’ which only gradually became fully 
articulated after the completion of the research which led to the conceptualisation of 
‘cultural capital’ was that detached observation had to be situated in order to liberate 
an encounter between cultures possessing varying degrees of naturalness and 
artificiality . As Bourdieu recognized in “The Genesis of the Concepts of Habitus and 
Field” (Bourdieu, 1985), we have to recognize the socio-historical contingency of 
concepts which functioned effectively at one moment but may not necessarily 
function similarly at a future moment – even when the past conceptualisation has in 
part constituted the present situation. In following Bourdieu’s work in the present, we 
have to be careful that social inclusion arises from the articulation of difference and is 
not itself a mechanism of exclusion, a euphemisation of the social and cultural 
dominance of the already dominant.  We have to be careful to ensure that, as social 
scientists, we are sensitive to the changing market of culture in which we participate 
and do not deploy the concept of ‘cultural capital’ statically – as an instrument of 
consecrated social science - in a way which might consolidate the social inequalities 
which it originally exposed. 
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